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Abstract. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a decision-making technique that has been widely studied and developed by the
scientific community. The interest in this tool is because it combines scientific rigor with the simplicity of its application.
Additionally, it has been extended to uncertainty frameworks, such as fuzzy and neutrosophic frameworks. This paper aims to
define a new method called NAHP+NSC, where the Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy Process (NAHP) is combined with the
recently introduced Neutrosophic Social Choice (NSC) theory. Neutrosophy incorporates indeterminacy to both the AHP
technique and the SC theory, which is an intrinsic condition of any decision-making process. On the other hand, it is possible to
count on a group of experts to carry out the NAHP evaluations, where the chosen alternative is the one with the highest votes.
Experts are divided into kind of homogeneous sub-groups called Interest Groups (IG), where each IG conjointly evaluates the
proposed alternatives, and then tools of NSC are used for choosing the best alternative. The contribution of this new method is
that evaluations and results are more accurate when indeterminacy is incorporated.
Keywords: Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy Process, neutrosophic social choice theory, neutrosophic preference relations,
group decision-making.

1 Introduction
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a technique introduced by Thomas L. Saaty for decision-making, [1]. It
is a peculiar technique because the result encloses mathematical and psychology rigor. The decision maker starts
from a decision tree with different hierarchical levels, where the top level contains a single leaf that represents the
goal of the decision, the intermediate levels represent the attributes and sub-attributes necessaries to make the
decision, while the level on bottom contains the alternatives to make the decisions.
The decision maker must compare the relative importance among the attributes, the sub-attributes and finally
the alternatives are evaluated with respect to the attributes and sub-attributes, in such a way that the relative
importance of each alternative is obtained, which are then ordered so that the preferred one is that with the highest
index. These measurements are based on a scale introduced by Saaty. In addition, the consistency of each relative
comparison is measured.
This technique has been widely studied for its simplicity and applicability in more or less complex decisionmaking situations. Additionally, the Saaty’s scale has been generalized from crisp numbers to fuzzy numbers, to
contain the uncertainty of decision-making, [2, 3]. The extension of the method to a Neutrosophic Analytic
Hierarchy Process (NAHP) is also introduced; see [4-9], where the pair-wise comparison is performed with
triangular neutrosophic numbers. Neutrosophy allows us to incorporate indeterminacy into the method [10] that is
the result of lack of knowledge, inconsistencies or contradictions, which is an essential part of any complex
decision-making problem[11].
AHP has also hybridized with other techniques such as SWOT or TOPSIS, [5, 7], to enhance its strength as a
decision-making tool. However, due to AHP interest, and its development, some new needs have arisen through
classical and non-classical AHP, because more than one expert can make the decision. This makes the method
more accurate, and the decision is consensual, but on the other hand AHP theory becomes more complex and that
yields some additional questions, such as what are the ways to aggregate the elements of the decision tree of experts
or what is the way to consider the evaluations of the experts belonging to different interest groups.
B. Srdjevic in [12], defines a method where the classic AHP hybridizes with tools of the Social Choice Theory,
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[13-17]. He called this hybridization AHP+SC. The theory of social choice deals with making collective decisions
based on the preferences of the individuals that make up a society. Considering a set of social alternatives and a
society whose individuals have preferences, these preferences are represented by binary relations over the set of
alternatives. Keeping in mind that individuals may have different opinions about social alternatives; the Social
Choice theory studies the process of aggregation of individual preferences in a social preference. Collective
decisions will be made from the social binary relationship that has been obtained by aggregating individual
preferences. That is to say, given a set of social alternatives, a social welfare function assigns to each state of
opinion a binary relationship; in general, there is infinity of aggregation processes. Specifically, this theory studies
voting methods.
Recently, the theory of social choice has been extended to Neutrosophy, [18], with the intention of applying it
to decision-making, where the so-called Neutrosophic Social Choice (NSC) theory was introduced. In that paper,
Topal et al. define preferences in a neutrosophic environment. In addition, they use a new form of truth
representation of neutrosophic theory called Distributed Indeterminacy Form (DIF), as well as an accuracy
function H that serves as a de-neutrosophication method.
In this paper authors are inspired by the method proposed in [12] to introduce a new one in the neutrosophic
framework. That is, AHP+SC becomes in NAHP+NSC, where NAHP includes indeterminacy within the AHP
technique, which binds with the NSC of Topal et al. Specifically, a group of experts is considered, each of which
has its own NAHP evaluation. On the other hand, NSC let us to use voting methods to determine the best alternative
by consensus. The method in [12] is based on the division of the group of experts into subgroups called Interest
Groups (IG) which for simplicity are considered internally homogeneous. Each of the IGs makes an evaluation
jointly, therefore there will be as many evaluations as existing IGs. NSC serves to select the best option among
IGs’ evaluations. Linking NAHP and NSC in a neutrosophic framework let us incorporate indeterminacy in
decision-making.
Next, the main concepts and methods on NAHP and NSC are discussed in Section 2 below. In section 3 the
method proposed in this paper is introduced and a simulated example is used as case study. The last section contains
the conclusions.
2 Preliminary concepts
This section is structured into two subsections. Subsection 2.1 describes the Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy
process (NAHP) technique. Subsection 2.2 contains the main concepts of the Neutrosophic Social Choice (NSC)
theory.
2.1 Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy process
In this subsection, we explain basic concepts of Neutrosophy, like neutrosophic set, single-valued neutrosophic
set, and the Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy Process (NAHP) technique.
Definition 1: ([19-28]) The Neutrosophic set N is characterized by three membership functions, which are the
truth-membership function TA, indeterminacy-membership function IA, and falsehood-membership function FA,
where U is the Universe of Discourse and xU , TA (x), IA (x), and FA (x)] −0, 1+ [ , and −0inf TA (x) +
inf IA (x) + inf FA (x) sup TA (x) + sup IA (x) + sup FA (x)3+ .
Notice that according to the definition, TA (x), IA (x), and FA (x) are real standard or non-standard subsets of
] −0, 1+ [ and hence, TA (x), IA (x), and FA (x) can be subintervals of [0, 1].
Definition 2: ([19-28]) The Single-Valued Neutrosophic Set (SVNS) N over U is A = {<
x; TA (x), IA (x), FA (x) > : xU} , where TA : U[0, 1], IA : U[0, 1], and FA : U[0, 1] , 0 TA (x) + IA (x) +
FA (x)  3.
The Single-Valued Neutrosophic number (SVNN) is represented by N = (t, i, f ), such that 0 t, i, f  1 and
0 t + i + f 3.
Definition 3: ([19-28]) The single-valued trapezoidal neutrosophic number,
ã = 〈(a1 , a2 . a3 , a4 ); αã , βã , γã 〉, is a neutrosophic set on ℝ, whose truth, indeterminacy and falsehood
membership functions are defined as follows, respectively:
Tã (x) =
αã( x−a1 ),
a2 −a1

αã,
αã( a3−x ),
a3 −a2

{ 0,
Iã (x) =

a1 ≤x≤a2
a2 ≤x≤a3

(1)

a3 ≤𝑥≤a4

otherwise
(2)
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(a2 − x + βã (x − a1 ))
,
a2 − a1
βã ,
(x − a2 + βã (a3 − x))
,
a3 − a2
{ 1,
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a1 ≤ x ≤ a2
a2 ≤ x ≤ a3
a3 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ a4
otherwise

Fã (x) =
(a2 − x + γã (x − a1 ))
,
a2 − a1
γã ,
(x − a2 + γã (a3 − x))
,
a3 − a2
{ 1,

a1 ≤ x ≤ a2
a2 ≤ x ≤ a3

(3)

a3 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ a4
otherwise

Where αã , βã , γã ∈ [0, 1], a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 ∈ ℝ and a1 ≤ a2 ≤ a3 ≤ a4 .
Definition 4: ([19-28]) Given ã = 〈(a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 ); αã , βã , γã 〉 and b̃ = 〈(b1 , b2 , b3 , b4 ); αb̃ , βb̃ , γb̃ 〉 two
single-valued trapezoidal neutrosophic numbers and  any non-null number in the real line. Then, the following
operations are defined:
1. Addition: ã + b̃ = 〈(a1 + b1 , a2 + b2 , a3 + b3 , a4 + b4 ); αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉
2. Subtraction: ã − b̃ = 〈(a1 − b4 , a2 − b3 , a3 − b2 , a4 − b1 ); αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉
3. Inversion: ã−1 = 〈(a4 −1 , a3 −1 , a2 −1 , a1 −1 ); αã , βã , γã 〉, where a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 ≠ 0.
4. Multiplication by a scalar number:
〈(λa1 , λa2 , λa3 , λa4 ); αã , βã , γã 〉,
λã = {
〈(λa4 , λa3 , λa2 , λa1 ); αã , βã , γã 〉,

λ>0
λ<0

5.

Division of two trapezoidal neutrosophic numbers:
a a a a
〈( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ) ; αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉 , a4 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 > 0
b4 b3 b2 b1
a4 a3 a2 a1
ã
= 〈( , , , ) ; αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉 , a4 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 > 0
̃b
b4 b3 b2 b1
a a a a
〈( 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 ) ; αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉 , a4 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 < 0
{ b1 b2 b3 b4
6. Multiplication of two trapezoidal neutrosophic numbers:
〈(a1 b1 , a2 b2 , a3 b3 , a4 b4 ); αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉,
a4 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 > 0
̃
〈(
)
〉
a4 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 > 0
ãb = { a1 b4 , a2 b3 , a3 b2 , a4 b1 ; αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ ,
〈(a4 b4 , a3 b3 , a2 b2 , a1 b1 ); αã ∧ αb̃ , βã ∨ βb̃ , γã ∨ γb̃ 〉,
a4 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 b4 < 0
Where, ∧ is a t-norm and ∨ is a t-conorm.
Definitions 3 and 4 refer to single-valued triangular neutrosophic number when the condition a2 = a3 holds
[24].
We can find in [4] the theory of AHP technique in a neutrosophic framework. Thus, we can model the
indeterminacy of decision-making from applying neutrosophic AHP or NAHP for short.
Equation 4 contains a generic neutrosophic pair-wise comparison matrix for NAHP.
1̃ ã12 ⋯ ã1n
̃= [
A
⋮
⋱
⋮ ]
(4)
ã n1 ãn2 ⋯ 1̃
̃ must satisfy condition ãji = ã−1
Matrix A
ij , based on the inversion operator of Definition 4, according to the
scale summarized in Table 1 of triangular neutrosophic numbers.
For converting neutrosophic triangular numbers into crisp numbers, there are two indexes defined in [5], they
are the so-called score and accuracy indexes, respectively, see Equations 5 and 6:
1
(5)
S(ã) = [a1 + a2 + a3 ](2 + αã −βã − γã )
8
1
(6)
A(ã) = [a1 + a2 + a3 ](2 + αã −βã + γã )
8
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Saaty’s scale
1
3
5
7
9
2, 4, 6, 8

Definition
Equally influential
Slightly influential
Strongly influential
Very strongly influential
Absolutely influential
Sporadic values between two close scales

Neutrosophic Triangular Scale
1̃ = 〈(1, 1,1); 0.50, 0.50, 0.50〉
3̃ = 〈(2, 3, 4); 0.30, 0.75, 0.70〉
5̃ = 〈(4, 5, 6); 0.80, 0.15, 0.20〉
7̃ = 〈(6, 7, 8); 0.90, 0.10, 0.10〉
9̃ = 〈(9, 9, 9); 1.00, 0.00, 0.00〉
2̃ = 〈(1, 2, 3); 0.40, 0.65, 0.60〉
4̃ = 〈(3, 4, 5); 0.60, 0.35, 0.40〉
6̃ = 〈(5, 6, 7); 0.70, 0.25, 0.30〉
8̃ = 〈(7, 8, 9); 0.85, 0.10, 0.15〉

Table 1: Saaty’s scale translated to a neutrosophic triangular scale.

To get the score and the accuracy degree of ã ji the following equations are used:
𝐒(ãji ) = 1⁄
(7)
𝐒(ã ij )
𝐀(ã ji ) = 1⁄
(8)
𝐀(ãij )
With compensation by accuracy degree of each triangular neutrosophic number in the neutrosophic pair-wise
comparison matrix, we derive the following deterministic matrix:

𝐴= [

1 a12
⋮
an1 an2

⋯ a1n
⋱
⋮ ]
⋯ 1

(9)

Next, we determine the ranking of priorities from the previous matrix as follows:
1. Normalize the column entries by dividing each entry by the sum of the column.
2. Take the total of the row averages.
The Consistency Index (CI) is calculated for matrices in formula 9, which is a function depending on max, the
maximum eigenvalue of the matrix. Saaty establishes that consistency of the evaluations can be determined by
λ
−n
equation CI = max , [1],where n is the order of the matrix. Also, the Consistency Ratio (CR) is defined by
n−1
equation CR = CI/RI, where RI is given in Table 2.
Order (n)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

RI

0

0

0.52

0.89

1.11

1.25

1.35

1.40

1.45

1.49

Table 2: RI associated to every order.

If CR0.1 we can consider that experts’ evaluation is sufficiently consistent and hence we can proceed to use
NAHP. We apply this procedure to matrices A in Equation 9. Consult [4] for more details on NAHP.
2.2 Neutrosophic Social Choice theory
This subsection summarizes the main concepts of Neutrosophic Social Choice theory developed in [18].
Definition 5: ([18]) Let a = (Ta , Ia , Fa ) be a single-valued neutrosophic number with truth value Ta ,
indeterminacy value Ia , and falsehood value Fa . Distributed Indeterminacy Form (DIF) of a is defined as aDIF =
(Ta − Ta Ia , 0, Fa − Fa Ia ).
DIF aims to distribute the indeterminacy result on truth and falsehood, thus, this measures the degree of
affectation of the truthiness and falsehood, when indeterminacy varies.
Definition 6: ([18]) Let a be a single-valued neutrosophic number. An accuracy function H of a is:
H(𝑎) =

1 + Ta − Ia (1 − Ta ) − Fa (1 − Ia )
2

(10)

Where for all a, H(𝑎) ∈ [0, 1]. H is an order relation which represents an accuracy score of information of a.
If H(𝑎1 ) = H(𝑎2 ), then 𝑎1 = 𝑎2, i.e., they have the same information, whereas, if H(𝑎1 ) < H(𝑎2 ), then 𝑎2 is
larger than 𝑎1 .
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Let S = {s1 , s2 , . . . , sn } be a set of alternatives and m be a set of individuals. Each individual declares his or
her preferences over S which are represented by an individual neutrosophic preference relation R k , where NRk ∶
S × S → [0,1] × [0,1] × [0,1] and matrix R k = [𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 ], i, j = 1,2,3, . . , n; k = 1,2,3, . . . , m, where 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 =
NRk (𝑟𝑖𝑘 , 𝑟𝑗𝑘 ).
(0.5, 0.5,0.5)
𝑘
R k = 𝑟21
⋮
𝑘
[𝑟𝑛1

𝑘
𝑟12
(0.5, 0.5,0.5)
⋮
𝑘
𝑟𝑛2

⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯

𝑘
𝑟1𝑛
𝑘
𝑟2𝑛
⋮
(0.5, 0.5,0.5)]

The function H (called neutrosophic index or neutrosophic hesitation function) assigns each 𝑎𝑖𝑗 neutrosophic
value to a number in [0, 1]. Thus, the neutrosophic index or neutrosophic hesitation function is defined as
follows:
1 + T(𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) − I(𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) (1 − T(𝑎𝑖𝑗 )) − F(𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) (1 − I(𝑎𝑖𝑗 ))
(11)
H(𝑎) =
2
The matrix RHk = [H(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 )], i, j = 1,2,3, . . , n; k = 1,2,3, . . . , m.
𝑘)
H((0.5, 0.5,0.5)) H(𝑟12
( 𝑘)
H((0.5, 0.5,0.5))
RHk = H 𝑟21
⋮
⋮
𝑘 )
𝑘
(
(
H
𝑟
H
𝑟
[ 𝑛1
𝑛2 )

⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯

𝑘 )
H(𝑟1𝑛
𝑘 )
H(𝑟2𝑛
⋮
H((0.5, 0.5,0.5))]

RHk is quasi-reciprocal if and only if H(𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 ) ≤ 1 − H(𝑟𝑗𝑖𝑘 ). If RHk is not quasi-reciprocal, we call k an
irrational individual.
Other definitions declared in [18] are the following:
𝑘)
(0.5, 0,0.5) DIF(𝑟12
𝑘
( )
(0.5, 0,0.5)
DIF(R k ) = DIF 𝑟21
⋮
⋮
𝑘 )
𝑘 )
[DIF(𝑟𝑛1
DIF(𝑟𝑛2

⋯
⋯
⋯
⋯

𝑘 )
DIF(𝑟1𝑛
𝑘 )
DIF(𝑟2𝑛
⋮
(0.5, 0,0.5)]

R i : preference matrix of the i-th individual,
DIF(R i ): DIF of preference matrix of the i-th individual,
RHi : range of preference matrix of the i-th individual under H function,
rkH (ij): represents the element at the row i and column j of RHk ,
hk (ij): distribution of the kth individual's votes for each pair-wise comparison of alternative's value. It is
determined through 0.5 derived from RHi ,
⟦hk ⟧: the matrix obtained by each element of hk (ij),
⟦Hij ⟧: matrix of the group vote,
Ak : the degree for preference k assigned by the group,
𝑎ijk : majority determination value for preference k of the group (the element at the row i and column j of ⟦hk ⟧,
Hijk : majority determination value for preference k of the group under H function,
1, if rkH (ij) > 0.5
hk (ij) = {
0, otherwise
Hπij : average majority determination value of the group under H function,
Hπ : consensus winner determination matrix,
𝐶(si ): social aggregation function for the alternative (preference) si .
Definition 7: ([18]): si ∈ W is called a consensus winner if and only if ∀sj ≠ si : rij > 0.5, where rij ∈ Hπ .
Definition 8: ([18]) The social aggregation average function C is defined to calculate the order of si in the
group to the extent that individuals are not against option si , using the following equation:

𝐶 (si ) =

1
∑ rij
m−1

(12)

i≠j

Where i, j = 1, 2, ⋯ , m.
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3 NAHP+NSC method
In this section we introduce the NAHP+NSC method that is proposed in this paper.
First of all we define for any triangular neutrosophic number ã , the triangular accuracy function of 𝑎̃ =
〈(a1 , a2 , a3 , a4 ); αã , βã , γã 〉, which is the function TA defined as follows:
TA(ã) = A(〈(a1 , a2 , a3 ); DIF((αã , βã , γã ))〉)

(13)

This is the accuracy degree of Equation 6 calculated for the DIF of the neutrosophic number contained in ã.
DIF is included following the idea in [18], where the accuracy function H also calculates the effect of
indeterminacy in the truthiness and falsehood.
Let us note that reciprocal or quasi-reciprocal properties in NSC theory are similar to the reciprocal property
in NAHP, from the point of view of the decision maker’s rationality.
The method consists of the following steps:
1. The goal of the problem is established, and consequently the group of experts is selected. Next,
the attributes, sub-attributes and alternatives are specified.
2. The group of experts is divided into M interest sub-groups, let us denote them by IG =
{IG1 , IG2 , ⋯ , IGM }. We assumed the members of each sub-group form a homogenous decision
group.
3. Each expert evaluates his/her own NAHP. However, with respect to every IGi the equivalent
matrices of the members of the sub-group are aggregated using formula 14.
̃ i1 , A
̃ i2 , ⋯ , A
̃ in } be a set of ni SVTNNs representing the assessment of each member of the i-th subLet {A
i
̃
group, where Aij = 〈(aij , bij , cij ); αãij , βãij , γãij 〉 (i = 1, 2, … , M )(j = 1, 2, … , ni ), then the weighted mean of the
SVTNNs is calculated through the following Equation:
ni

̃ i = ∑ λij A
̃ ij
A

(14)

j=1

̃ ij , λij [0, 1] and ∑ni λij = 1.
Where λij is the weight of A
j=1
Note that λij measures the relative importance of the j-th expert in the i-th sub-group.
̃ i represents the matrix of pair-wise comparisons of NAHP method in IGi, to aggregate the matrices of
Each A
pair-wise comparison of criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives.
̃ i s are converted into 𝐴i s using Equation 13. This process can be repeated until the results are consistent
A
according to the Consistency Ratio of the NAHP method. In accordance with the NAHP method, we obtain a
vector of preference of the alternatives.
Here, the Aggregation of Individual Judgments (AIJ) is used because we are interested in measuring the
judgments of the sub-group as a synergistic unit.
Let us denote by O𝑖 = {o𝑖1 , o𝑖2 , ⋯ , o𝑖𝑁 } the position of each alternative S𝑖 = {𝑠𝑖1 , 𝑠𝑖2 , ⋯ , 𝑠𝑖𝑁 }, when they are
evaluated by the members of the i-th sub-group. For example, O1 = {1,1,3,5,4} means that according to the first
subgroup, alternatives 1 and 2 are equally preferred, whereas, the next ones are the third, the fifth, and the fourth
alternatives, in that order.
4. For each 𝑠𝑖𝑙 (l = 1, 2, … , N), the following triple is formed Vil = (P𝑖𝑙 , I𝑖𝑙 , N𝑖𝑙 ), where P𝑖𝑙 =
𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑({𝑘 ≠ 𝑙: 𝑠𝑖𝑙 is strictly preferred over s𝑖𝑘 }), I𝑖𝑙 = 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑({𝑘 ≠
𝑙: 𝑠𝑖𝑙 is equally preferred to s𝑖𝑘 }) and N𝑖𝑙 = 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑({𝑘 ≠ 𝑙: 𝑠𝑖𝑘 is strictly preferred over s𝑖𝑙 }).
See that, Vil ∈ [0, N − 1] × [0, N − 1] × [0, N − 1] and P𝑖𝑙 + I𝑖𝑙 + N𝑖𝑙 = N − 1.
Finally, Vl ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] × [0, 1], Vl = (P𝑙 , I𝑙 , N𝑙 ), aggregates the preference of the l-th
∑𝑀 P

∑𝑀 I

∑𝑀 N

𝑖=1 𝑖𝑙
𝑖=1 𝑖𝑙
𝑖=1 𝑖𝑙
alternative for all sub-groups, where P𝑙 = M(N−1)
, I𝑙 = M(N−1)
, and N𝑙 = M(N−1)
.

Note that this is a neutrosophic voting method.
H(Vl ) (l = 1,2, ⋯ , N) is calculated, and the alternatives are sorted by order of preference, such
that Vl1 is preferred over Vl2 if and only if H(Vl1 ) > H(Vl2 ). When, H(Vl1 ) = H(Vl2 ) we say that
“Vl1 is equally preferred to Vl2 ”.
Below we illustrate this method with an example.
5.

Example 1: (See [29])
Organizations face the problem of how to invest their resources in the different project alternatives. The correct
evaluation and subsequent selection of software development projects provides competitive advantages to
organizations. The selection of projects in the field of information technology presents multiple challenges,
including the difficulty of evaluating intangible benefits, the existing interdependencies between projects, and the
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restrictions imposed by organizations.
The goal of this decision making problem is to assess three candidates of Information Technology Projects
based on three criteria, namely, cost, project time span and profit. We call alternatives by Project 1, Project 2, and
Project 3. The decision tree is depicted in Figure 1.
To assess
projects

Cost

Project time span

Profit

Project 1

Project 2

Project 3

Figure 1: AHP tree of the example. Source [29].

This is a simulated example for illustrating how the NAHP+NSC technique can be applied in a decision-making
problem. Suppose a group of 15 experts are selected to make the decision, and three sub-groups are formed, each
of them containing 5 members. They are: IG1 which contains the managers, IG2 is the sub-group of financial
analysts, and IG3 is the interest group of specialists in information technology.
When the 15 experts give their evaluation according to the NAHP method, matrices of the IG1 members are
aggregated using formula 14, as well as the members of IG2, and IG3. Next, the results for each IG are deneutrosophied using Equation 13, and the NAHP is completed for each interest group. To exemplify these steps,
suppose the group assessment of IG1 is summarized in Table 3 for the pair-wise comparison of the criteria.
Cost
1̃
̃2−1
5̃

Cost
Project time span
Profit

Project time span
2̃
1̃
4̃

Profit
5̃−1
4̃−1
1̃

Table 3: Group assessment of criteria by the members of IG1. Source [29].

Table 4 contains the results to calculate TA(∙) according to Equation 13.
Cost
0.93750
0.56738
5.3438

Cost
Project time span
Profit

Project time span
1.7625
0.93750
3.9750

Profit
0.18713
0.25157
0.93750

Table 4: TA(∙) of the group assessment of criteria by the members of IG1

The calculation of consistency is λmax = 3.02075, then, CI = 0.010375, and CR = 0.019952<0.1, therefore the
group decision of IG1 is consistent.
The weight of every criterion according to the members of IG 1 is the following, 0.19377 for the cost, 0.11788
for the time span, and 0.68835 for the profit.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize the results of pair-wise evaluating projects 1, 2, and 3 with respect to cost, time
span and profit criteria, respectively, collectively by members of IG 1. The numbers in parentheses are the crisp
values after calculating TA. The rightmost column contains the priority vector of each project.
Project 1

Project 2

Project3

Priority vector

Project 1

1̃(0.93750)

2̃(1.7625)

Project 2
Project 3

5̃−1(0.18713)

1̃(0.93750)
̃5−1(0.18713)

5̃(5.3438)
5̃(5.3438)

0.496401

2̃−1(0.56738)

1̃(0.93750)

0.080952

0.422647

Table 5: Reciprocal matrix of the projects related to Cost and their priority vector (rightmost column). The parentheses contain TA values
of the triangular neutrosophic numbers.
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Project 1

Project 2

Project3

Priority vector

Project 1

1̃(0.93750)

5̃−1(0.18713)

2̃−1(0.56738)

0.13012

Project 2

5̃(5.3438)

1̃(0.93750)

2̃(1.7625)

0.61860

Project 3

2̃(1.7625)

2̃−1(0.56738)

1̃(0.93750)

0.25128

Table 6: Reciprocal matrix of the projects related to Project Time span and their priority vector (rightmost column). The parentheses
contain TA values of the triangular neutrosophic numbers.

Project 1

Project 2

Project3

Priority vector

Project 1

1̃(0.93750)

5̃(5.3438)

2̃(1.7625)

0.61860

Project 2

5̃−1(0.18713)

1̃(0.93750)

2̃−1(0.56738)

0.13012

Project 3

2̃−1(0.56738)

2̃(1.7625)

1̃(0.93750)

0.25128

Table 7: Reciprocal matrix of the projects related to Profit and their priority vector (rightmost column). The parentheses contain TA values
of the triangular neutrosophic numbers.

It is easy to check the consistency of the assessments in Tables 5-7.
Table 8 contains the global weights of the three projects by the members of IG1.
Costs

Project time span

Profit

Global Weight

Project 1

0.496401

0.13012

0.61860

0.53734

Project 2

0.422647

0.61860

0.13012

0.24438

Project 3

0.080952

0.25128

0.25128

0.21828

Criterion Weight

0.19377

0.11788

0.68835

1.00000

Table 8: Global weight matrix by IG1.

Therefore, the members of IG1 sort the projects in the following order, p1 ≻ p2 ≻ p3 .
Suppose that also for IG2 the order of preference is p1 ≻ p2 ≻ p3 , whereas, according to the members of IG3
the order is p1 ≻ p2 = p3 .
The final results of the method are V11 = V21 = V31 = (2,0,0), which means project 1 is preferred over the
rest of projects (two of them), there is not any project preferred over project 1 and it is not equally preferred to
another project, for the three IG.
V12 = V22 = (1,0,1) and V32 = (0,1,1), that means for the first and second sub-groups, project 2 is preferred
over one project and not preferred over the other one, whereas, for the third IG, project 2 is equally preferred to
one project and not preferred over the other one. Additionally, V13 = V23 = (0,0,2), and V33 = (0,1,1).
For each alternative we have, V1 = (
and V3 = (

0+0+0 0+0+1 2+2+1
2(3)

,

2(3)

,

2(3)

2+2+2 0+0+0 0+0+0

2(3)
1 5

,

2(3)

,

2(3)

) = (1, 0, 0), V2 = (

1+1+0 0+0+1 1+1+1
2(3)

,

2(3)

,

2(3)

1 1 1

) = (3 , 6 , 2),

) = (0, 6 , 6). See that here M = N = 3.

Finally, H(V1 ) = 1, H(V2 ) = 0.40278, and H(V3 ) = 0.069444. Then, project 1 is the preferred one.
Conclusion
This paper introduces for the first time a group decision-making method based on neutrosophic analytic
hierarchy process associated with elements of the neutrosophic social choice theory, it is called NAHP+NSC. The
advantages of this technique are that it incorporates the indeterminacy as part of the decision-making. So, the result
is more accurate than methods where indeterminacy is not explicitly considered. The group of experts is divided
into interest groups, therefore the result is consistent, and the hybridization with the neutrosophic social choice
theory allow decision makers to rigorously select the best option. Briefly, to combine AHP technique with SC
theory in a neutrosophic framework is a complete tool for decision-making. An example is used for illustrating the
applicability and the advantages of NAHP+NSC. Future works will consider other voting methods, even modelling
with both, offsets [30, 31] and voting game theory as in [32].
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